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Abstract
We present a novel attack named “Tap ’n Ghost”, which aims to attack the touchscreens of
NFC-enabled mobile devices such as smartphones. Tap ’n Ghost consists of two striking attack
techniques—“Tag-based Adaptive Ploy (TAP)” and “Ghost Touch Generator.” First, using an NFC
card emulator embedded in a common object such as table, a TAP system performs tailored attacks
on the victim’s smartphone by employing device fingerprinting; e.g., popping up a customized di-
alog box asking whether or not to connect to an attacker’s Bluetooth mouse. Further, Ghost Touch
Generator forces the victim to connect to the mouse even if she or he aimed to cancel the dialog by
touching the “cancel” button; i.e., it alters the selection of a button on a screen. After the connec-
tion is established, the attacker can remotely take control of the smartphone, with the knowledge
about the layout of the screen derived from the device fingerprinting. To evaluate the practicality
of the attack, we perform an online survey with 300 respondents and a user study involving 16 par-
ticipants. The results demonstrate that the attack is realistic. We additionally discuss the possible
countermeasures against the threats posed by Tap ’n Ghost.

5Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction 11
Chapter 2 Background 13
2.1 NFC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Capacitive Touchscreen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Chapter 3 Overview of the attack 15
3.1 Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Triggering High Risk Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3 End-to-End Attack Scenario: A Case for the Malicious Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Chapter 4 Tag-based Adaptive Ploy 19
4.1 Overview of the TAP attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 Camouflage techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Chapter 5 Ghost Touch Generator 23
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2 Characteristics of the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.1 Experimental setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.2 Effect of the frequencies and voltage values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2.3 Spatial distribution of the false touch events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.4 Limiting the dispersion with a real touch event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3 Attack Mechanism Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chapter 6 Technical Feasibility Assessments 31
6.1 Maximum NFC Reading Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2 Conditions of the successful Ghost Touch Generator.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Chapter 7 Practicality of the Threat 35
7.1 Validity of A1 (Device constraint) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2 Validity of A2 (NFC availability) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.3 Validity of A3 (Human behavior) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.4 Attack Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.5 Implementation Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.6 Attack Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Chapter 8 Discussion 43
8.1 Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.2 Ethical considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Contents
8.3 Open research question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Chapter 9 Related Work 45
Chapter 10 Conclusion 47
Acknowledgment 49
Relevant Research Achievements 51
Bibliography 53
Appendices 55
A Electrical Touch Attack 57
B Smartphone Status Monitoring System 59
C Supplemental Data 63
6
7List of Figures
2.1 Touch detection mechanism of mutual capacitance touchscreen [1]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1 Overview of the Tap ’n Ghost attack.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1 Overview of the TAP attack with the device fingerprinting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.1 Experimental setup. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2 The effect of different frequencies on touchscreen.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3 Coordinates of the touch points reported by the touchscreen controller. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4 Coordinates of the touch points reported by the touchscreen controller while the
experiment a finger keeps touching the point centered on the screen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.5 Common-mode noise and normal-mode noise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.6 Diagrams of the circuits that express the high-level behavior of a touchscreen
controller when noise signal is injected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1 Block diagram and photos of setup for observing effect of alternating current on
off-the-shelf smartphones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1 Smartphone status monitoring system embedded in a wooden table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.2 Results of user study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.3 The attack parameters (n,m) vs. attack success probability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.1 A circuit board that triggers the electrical touches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.1 Diagram of an NFC reader/writer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
B.2 Layout of NFC reader/writers under a table top. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
B.3 Overview of the smartphone status monitoring system inside a table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
B.4 Overview of the smartphone status monitoring system inside a table with table cloth. 61
C.1 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (attack using Facebook app). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
C.2 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (attack using Dropbox app). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
C.3 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (normal). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.4 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (attacked). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.5 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (dimmed using Screen Filter app). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.6 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (customized for Xperia Z3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.7 An example of snippet code that implements the device fingerprinting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

9List of Tables
2.1 Android OS operations that can be launched by reading an NFC tag. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1 The conditions of the successful Ghost Touch Generator attack. The direction of
the scattering patterns is defined when a screen is set in portrait mode. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.1 Demography of respondents (online survey). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.2 Demography of the participants (user study). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
C.1 List of confirmation messages invoked by the WiFiConfig record. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
C.2 List of confirmation messages invoked by the BTSSP record. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
C.3 Results of Feasibility Studies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

11
Chapter 1 Introduction
Smartphones are used not only for accessing the various Internet services but also for interact-
ing with the networked devices around us, e.g., wireless headphones, fitness devices, smart home
devices, connected cars, and contactless payment systems. To communicate with these networked
devices, modern smartphones are shipped with various networking interfaces such as cellular net-
works, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and NFC. This trend has helped smartphones to get more and more con-
nected to our life — anywhere, anytime and with anything.
Given the pervasive network connectivity of smartphones, we propose a novel proof-of-concept
attack that is named “Tap ’n Ghost.” The Tap ’n Ghost attack is aimed at targeting the touchscreens
of NFC-enabled mobile devices such as smartphones. The Tap ’n Ghost consists of two striking
techniques—“Tag-based Adaptive Ploy (TAP)” and “Ghost Touch Generator.” These techniques
enable an attacker to trigger malicious events on the victim’s smartphone, such as connecting to
an attacker’s Bluetooth mouse, and allows the victim to connect to it despite the fact that she or he
intended to cancel the event by touching the “cancel” button. After the connection is established, the
attacker can remotely take control of the smartphone. These techniques can be covertly embedded
into common objects such as a table. As the common objects are routinely encountered in daily
life, they will never be considered as an NFC touchpoint. In the following, we briefly describe the
two techniques.
TAP consists of a processor, a communication interface, such as a Wi-Fi interface, and an NFC-
tag emulator, which is a device that makes use of the NFC card emulation mode and can act as
multiple NFC tags; thus, it can generate tailored attacks on a targeted smartphone. The standard
operation of TAP is as follows. First, it works as an NFC tag, which is programmed to visit a
malicious URL. A victim device that read the tag will be redirected to the URL. Further, TAPworks
with a web server behind the URL. The web server fingerprints the victim device and conveys the
type of the device to TAP. Next, TAP uses this information to tailor additional tags to be read by
the victim device.
Although TAP can induce a victim device to perform certain low-risk actions, such as opening
a URL without prompting the user, high-risk actions, such as pairing with a Bluetooth device, do
require user confirmation. To deal with this problem, we develop a new technique named Ghost
Touch Generator, which is aimed at deceiving victim devices into sensing “ghost touch events” on
their touch screens. The attack can alter the user’s selection; i.e., even though a victim touches
a “CANCEL” button, the attack can make the operating system recognize the event as a touch
of another button, “CONNECT.” The key idea underlying Ghost Touch Generator is to cause an
intentional malfunction by injecting intentional noise signals externally. We found that producing
large alternating voltages at a specific frequency near a touchscreen can cause a malfunction due to
capacitive coupling with the RX electrodes.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to study the threat of active attack against
touchscreens; that is, intentionally radiating signals toward a touchscreen to cause targeted malfunc-
tions. On the other hand, our work is not the first to study the threat of maliciously programmed
NFC tags. There have been several works that have addressed the issue [2–7]. An attacker can
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leverage an NFC tag to trigger risky actions; e.g., opening a malicious URL in a browser without
user approval [5] or forcing a smartphone to pair with a rogue Bluetooth device [4,5]. What distin-
guishes our approach from prior work is that by leveraging NFC card emulation, ours can achieve
complex and tailored attacks, such as adjusting the attack parameters based on the victim’s smart-
phone model; i.e., it can perform device fingerprinting. In addition, unlike the previously reported
malicious NFC attacks, our attack is intangible; instead of actively prompting victims to touch a
point such as a smart poster where a malicious NFC tag is embedded, Tap ’n Ghost passively waits
for victims to approach a malicious NFC tag emulator that is embedded within ordinary objects.
Even if the NFC tag launches an event, victims will not realize that their devices are engaging in
the NFC communication originated from such an ordinary object.
We make the following contributions:
• We present a novel class of attacks that we call Tap ’n Ghost, which injects malicious func-
tionalities into common objects (Chapter 3).
• We develop two effective techniques called “TAP” (Chapter 4) and “Ghost Touch Generator”
(Chapter 5).
• We demonstrate the technical feasibility of Tap ’n Ghost attacks using 24 smartphones for
TAP experiments and 7 smartphones for Ghost Touch Generator experiments (Chapter 6).
• We demonstrate the practicality of the threat through an online survey with 300 respondents
and an empirical user study with 16 participants (Chapter 7).
• We provide possible countermeasures against the threats of Tap ’n Ghost attacks (Chapter 8).
To visually demonstrate the feasibility of our attack, we provide demo videos of the experiments.
They are available at https://goo.gl/xoVt23. A part of this work was presented in the
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, May 2019.
12
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Chapter 2 Background
In this chapter, we provide background information on the two key technologies used in our
attack, NFC and capacitive touchscreen, which are widely used in smartphones.
2.1 NFC
Near-Field Communication (NFC) is a short-range wireless communication technology widely
used in many applications, e.g., contactless payment systems, transit passes, smart posters, and
smartphone apps. While the theoretical working distance of NFC is up to 20 cm, the practical
working distance is a maximum of about 4 cm. According to Ref. [8], the number of smartphones
equipped with NFC is drastically increasing year by year. Roughly two-thirds of all smartphones
shipped in 2018 are expected to be equipped with NFC.
NFC is a communication protocol that can exchange data just by bringing NFC compatible de-
vices close to each other. In many NFC applications, communication is established without going
through user interaction. This design leads to high usability. However, the high usability of NFC
raises several security issues. Although the NFC communication range is limited to only a few
centimeters and tags can be configured to be read-only, the NFC service can be easily exploited by
a simple attack—replacing the existing NFC tag with a malicious NFC tag. Several studies have
reported the threats of malicious NFC tags [2–7]. We will summarize these studies in Chapter 9.
Our attack exploits the NFC implementation of the Android OS version 4.1 or later*1. According
to the statistics shown in Ref. [9], the fraction of Android devices with OS versions older than 4.1
account for less than 1% as of October 2018. Thus, our NFC-based attack is applicable to most
of the Android smartphones. When an Android device is held over an NFC tag, Android OS
can perform various operations by reading the data recorded in the NFC tag. Table 2.1 lists the
operations that can be launched by reading an NFC tag.
Table 2.1 Android OS operations that can be launched by reading an NFC tag.
operation requests user approval
open a specified URL No
launch a specified app No
send an Intent to an NFC-enabled app No
launch an Instant app No
send email to specified address with
specified subject and body
Yes
connect to specified Wi-Fi AP Yes
pair with specified Bluetooth device Yes
*1 Our attack exploits the following features: NFC Reader mode (supported from Android 2.3), Android Application
Records (supported from Android 4.0), and Bluetooth pairing via NFC (supported from Android 4.1).
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Fig. 2.1 Touch detection mechanism of mutual capacitance touchscreen [1].
2.2 Capacitive Touchscreen
The majority of the current mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, are equipped with
touchscreens. While there are various technologies for sensing touch, mutual capacitive sensors are
widely used in smartphones as they have high resolution and multi-touch support [10].
As shown in Figure 2.1, a mutual capacitive touchscreen controller consists of the grid of the
transmitter (TX) electrodes and receiver (RX) electrodes, which are mutually coupled, e.g., C0
in the figure. These TX/RX electrodes are used for sensing touch events. As the human body
has a capacitance, it can act as a capacitor. When a finger approaches the screen’s surface, the
capacitance between the TX and RX electrodes will change. This is because the finger extracts an
electric charge from the touchscreen through mutual capacitance (Cf in the figure). The changes
in capacitance between the TX and RX electrodes, δC, will cause changes in electric charge, δQ,
which is expressed as δQ = δC × VTX , where VTX is TX driver voltage. Thus, the touchscreen
controller can detect touches by measuring the changes in the amount of electric current that flows
into the RX electrodes. The pair of TX and RX electrodes for which the changes are detected is
used to locate the area of touch.
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Chapter 3 Overview of the attack
In this chapter, we present the overview of Tap ’n Ghost attack. We first describe our threat
model. We then present how the TAP attack can trigger high risk actions. Finally, we describe the
end-to-end attack scenario and its consequences.
3.1 Threat model
In this work, we assume an attacker has embedded several components used for the attack, e.g.,
an NFC-tag emulator, a single-board computer, and high-voltage transformer, in a common object
such as table. The cost of implementing such a system will be discussed in Sec. 7.5. We also
assume the victim has an Android smartphone equipped with NFC. The victim unintentionally
places the smartphone close to a Tap ’n Ghost-installed table, and the smartphone automatically
reads a malicious NFC tag/emulator when it is unlocked and not in the sleep mode. In Chapter 7,
we will test the validity of these assumptions through an online survey and an user study.
After reading the NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) records stored in the malicious NFC
tag/emulator, the smartphone will execute a corresponding operation used for attacks, which will
be described in the next section. As triggering high risk actions such as connecting to Wi-Fi AP
requires user approval by displaying a dialog box with a confirmation message, we use two ap-
proaches to evade the user approval process. The first is to mislead the user into approving the
dialog box by different ways of manipulating the UI such as showing a misleading message (Chap-
ter 4). The second approach is an attack on the touchscreen named Ghost Touch Generator (Chap-
ter 5). Figure 3.1 summarizes the overview of the Tap ’n Ghost attack.
3.2 Triggering High Risk Actions
As shown in Table 2.1, two types of operations can be invoked via NFC: operations that require
user approval and operations that do not. The latter requirement will be automatically executed if
an NFC tag is brought close to a smartphone. We call an attack that makes use of such operations
as a single-shot attack. A representative example of a single-shot attack is opening a malicious
URL in a browser; such a malicious website can trigger download/installation of malware on the
smartphone [6].
By combining multiple single-shot attacks, we can create more sophisticated attacks, which we
call Tag-based Adaptive Ploy (TAP). TAP enables an attacker to establish various attacks including
device fingerprinting. As shown in Chapter 4, device fingerprinting is useful to infer the language
used for the device; the information can be used to display a dialog box with a misleading message
to the victim. The fingerprint information can also be used for displaying a dialog box with a
suitable message, which needs to be adaptive to the vendor-specific customization of confirmation
message strings. Furthermore, the fingerprint information is necessary to optimize the success rate
of the Ghost Touch Generator, which requires to adjust the frequency of external signals to be
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Fig. 3.1 Overview of the Tap ’n Ghost attack.
injected.
Operations that require user approval can trigger high risk attacks. For instance, by forcing a
device to connect to a malicious Wi-Fi AP, the attacker can establish the man-in-the-middle attack,
redirecting the device to download a malicious app. Or, the attacker can even take complete control
of the smartphone by forcing the device to pair with a Bluetooth mouse, which can be used as a
remote control. Thus, evading the user approval process is a key success factor of the attacks. One
way to evade the use approval process is to display a dialog box with a misleading message, e.g.,
requesting a user to reconnect to the network, which seems to be caused by the network connection
problem. Actual examples of composing such a misleading message will be described in Chapter 4.
Another way is to employ the new attack we developed, Ghost Touch Generator, which will be
described in Chapter 5. In the next section, we will describe the end-to-end attack scenario and its
consequences.
3.3 End-to-End Attack Scenario: A Case for the Malicious
Table
We present the end-to-end attack scenario of Tap ’n Ghost, which leverages the two attack tech-
niques: TAP and Ghost Touch Generator. In this scenario, we assume that the attacker implements
Tap ’n Ghost in a table, which we call Malicious Table.
Here are the steps to compromise the victims’ smartphone, using the malicious table.
Step 1 An attacker installs a Malicious Table in a public space such as a library or a cafe.
Step 2 A victim uses his/her smartphone at the table. The presence of the smartphone is detected
by the TAP device embedded into the table top.
Step 3 The TAP device performs the attack and collects a device fingerprint of the victim’s smart-
phone. Then, it triggers a high-risk action by letting the smartphone read the tailored NFC tags.
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Step 4 Upon receiving a pop-up dialog box, the victim will try to cancel the action by tapping
the cancel button. The Malicious Table will start the Ghost Touch Generator attack to alter the
selection of the buttons. In case the Ghost Touch Generator attack fails, theMalicious Table starts
over from Step 3 after a certain time interval.
After succeeding the compilation of attacks described above, an attacker can employ the further
attacks. For instance, the victim’s smartphone will be forced to pair with the Bluetooth mouse em-
ulated by the Malicious Table. The attacker can fully take control of the smartphone; for instance,
the attacker can install any apps remotely, using a paired Bluetooth mouse. The demo of such an
attack is presented in our demo videos, which are available at https://goo.gl/xoVt23.
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Chapter 4 Tag-based Adaptive
Ploy
In this chapter, we first provide an overview of the TAP attack. We then present several tech-
niques to mislead a victim.
4.1 Overview of the TAP attack
Figure 4.1 illustrates an overview of the TAP attack, which makes use of device fingerprinting.
It comprises the two primary components, an NFC tag emulator and a single-board computer with
a Wi-Fi controller installed. TAP works with a web server, which can be set anywhere connected
to the Internet, e.g., a cloud server. We note that the attacker also needs to install a power source.
By using the NFC-tag emulator, we can dynamically switch the NFC tags according to the attack
scenario.
web server
Device fingerprinting
4
Sends the model 
information
5
NFC 
emulator
single-board
computer
Emulates a URL NFC tag
Emulates a tag suited for
attacking the model
6
Reads the emulated tag
Visits the attacker’s 
website
2 7
3
embedded device
1
Fig. 4.1 Overview of the TAP attack with the device fingerprinting.
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We now describe how TAP works using the example shown in Figure 4.1*1.
Step 1 First, the NFC tag emulator acts as an NFC tag with a URL data recorded and waits for a
victim to approach.
Step 2 When the victim’s smartphone comes close to the emulator, it reads the tag and launches a
browser to open the URL.
Step 3 The browser then connects to the website specified by the recorded URL.
Step 4 The website employs device fingerprinting by using JavaScript to collect information about
the victim’s device.
Step 5 The website sends the device fingerprinting information to the onboard computer of TAP.
We assume that the computer has Internet access.
Step 6 Upon receiving the device information, the computer determines the tag suited for the vic-
tim’s device and rewrites the NDEF record of the NFC tag emulator.
Step 7 Finally, the victim’s smartphone reads the new NDEF record from the tag and gets attacked
again. Note that the smartphone will read a new record after the emulator is turned off (which
implies that the old tag went away) and turned on again.
4.2 Camouflage techniques
In the following, we present camouflage techniques, which are established by fully exploiting
the NFC stack. These camouflage techniques aim to mislead victims so that they will naturally
approve the requests that are triggered by the attacks. They also aim to keep the victims unaware of
the presence of the attacking devices. To further empower these camouflage techniques, an attacker
can leverage the device fingerprinting. To make the following explanations easy to follow, we first
describe a case in which the attacker does not use the device fingerprinting. We will then describe
a case in which the attacker needs device fingerprinting.
We present the scenario of a Wi-Fi attack as an example. In this scenario, the goal of the attacker
is to mislead a victim into touching the “CONNECT” button when a modified message pops up
after reading the malicious NFC tag with the WiFiConfig record. In the Android OS, the format
of the confirmation message invoked by the WiFiConfig NFC record is defined in [11]. Since
the maximum length of the strings used for specifying an SSID is set to 32 bytes, and the SSID
encoding scheme allows the use of the UTF-8 charset [12], the attacker can tweak the SSID strings
to deceive a victim.
We show an attack scenario using this trick. The attacker creates a malicious NFC tag with
the SSID of WiFiConfig record set to “again.” When the victim’s smartphone approaches to the
malicious tag emulated by the TAP system, the following confirmation message pops on the screen: Connect to network again?
When the victim notices this message popping up, she or he may think that the Internet connection
is lost, that the smartphone is asking to reconnect to the previously connected network, and will
touch the “CONNECT” button. Thus, the man-in-the-middle attack is established. Note that a
single-board computer can work as a malicious Wi-FI AP. Along with this line, the attacker can
create various misleading messages such as, Connect to network to prevent the data lost?
*1 For reference, a code snippet that implements the device fingerprinting is shown in Figure C.7 (Apendix). Our demo
movies (available at https://goo.gl/xoVt23) demonstrate how the entire device fingerprinting process works
in practice.
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Such a message will threaten the victim into touching the “CONNECT” button, which again will
connect the smartphone to the malicious Wi-Fi AP.
We now turn our attention to the case where the attacker needs device fingerprinting. Through
the analysis of 24 Android smartphones equipped with NFC, we found that several vendor cus-
tomizations use different formats for the confirmation messages*2. To cope with such differences,
the attacker can use the information obtained from device fingerprinting, which was presented in
Section 4.1.
In this camouflage attack, an attacker leverages the apps installed in the victim’s smartphone;
to this end, the attacker specifies “Android Application” in the NDEF record of a malicious tag
before presenting the next NFC tag that will pop up a message. After reading the application tag,
Android OS will automatically execute the application specified in the record without requiring
user approval. The attack aims to make a misleading message that looks real by creating a context.
It will lead the victim to think that the message was sent from the installed app, rather than from an
invisible attack device.
The attacker first sets an Application NFC tag that launches a popular SNS app, such as Face-
book. Subsequently, the Facebook app appears on the screen of the victim’s smartphone. The
attacker then sets the WiFiConfig NFC tag using the technique described previously. The message
popping on the screen appears as follows: Connect to network ? Facebook app is requesting.
Since the dialog box of this message appears on top of the Facebook app, it looks as if the message
is originating from the Facebook app*3. In addition, Some Facebook users may touch the “CON-
NECT” button, never knowing that the message is for connecting to a malicious Wi-Fi AP. We
provide screenshots of the attacks described above in the Appendix.
*2 For reference, we summarize the results in Table C.1, Table C.2, and Table C.3 (Appendix).
*3 Note that to create this message, we set the following text string as the SSID: “\u202E.gnitseuqer si ppa koobecaF“,
where ‘\u202E’ is a Unicode character known as RIGHT-TO-LEFT OVERRIDE.
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Chapter 5 Ghost Touch Generator
While some users may be trapped with the camouflage techniques described in the previous
section, careful users may notice the suspicious behavior and attempt to stop it. In this chapter,
we will introduce a new attack named Ghost Touch Generator, which aims to succeed in attacking
even when a victim user is careful enough to not get trapped with the camouflage techniques. We
will also discuss the attack mechanism insights.
5.1 Overview
Ghost Touch Generator is an attack that aims to scatter touch events around the original touch
area; i.e., even though a victim touches a “CANCEL” button, which should cancel the request to
connect to a malicious Wi-Fi AP, the attack makes the operating system recognize the event as a
touch of another button, “CONNECT,” in a probabilistic way. Thus, the attack can trick the user,
with a certain success rate. In the following section, we aim to present the basic mechanism of
Ghost Touch Generator and reveal the conditions that are needed to establish the attack.
The key idea of Ghost Touch Generator is to cause the malfunction by injecting intentional noise
signals from the external. Through the empirical observations, we found that we can intentionally
cause the malfunction by generating an electric field near the capacitive touchscreen controller,
using an electric circuit that can produce large alternating voltage. As we will discuss in Section 5.3,
applying strong signals causes changes in the current flowing into RX electrodes of the touchscreen
controller through the capacitive coupling, and the changes will be detected as the (false) touch
events, which are reported at positions where no touch is present.
5.2 Characteristics of the Attack
To study the conditions that can cause the “false touches,” we conduct several experiments using
the touchscreen controller that provides raw data collected from the capacitive sensors. In the
following, we first describe our experimental setup. Second, we attempt to specify the intrinsic
frequency of injected noise signal to maximize the false touches. We then analyze the spatial
patterns of the false touch events on the screen with a noise injected at a specific frequency. Finally,
we study how an actual touch event by a user affects the spatial patterns of the false touch events.
This final experiment will reveal the mechanism of Ghost Touch Generator.
5.2.1 Experimental setup
Figure 5.1 shows our experimental setup. Our objective is to measure the effect of noise signals
on the behavior of touchscreens. For this experiment, we use the Raspberry Pi 7-inch Touchscreen
Display. As an intentional noise signal, we use the sine-wave signal generated by a function gen-
erator. We set a copper sheet parallel to the touchscreen controller. This copper sheet is used to
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Fig. 5.1 Experimental setup.
create a capacitive coupling with the capacitive sensors. The distance between the sheet and con-
troller was set to 7 cm. We note that the attack can be applied from the rear side of a touchscreen
controller, i.e., the rear side of a smartphone.
5.2.2 Effect of the frequencies and voltage values
We generate sine-wave noise signals with different frequencies and voltage values. We record
raw capacitance values and touch events using the software we developed. Since the touchscreen
has 264 capacitance sensors, which consists of a 12 × 22 matrix, we can obtain 264-dimensional
time-series data. This setup enables us to analyze the spatial patterns of the generated touch events.
To measure the interference intensity on the touchscreen, we introduce a metric, ∆, which is
defined as∆ = maxi(δi)−mini(δi), where δi = xi− x¯i and xi (i ∈ {1, . . . , 264}) is a measured
value for each sensor and x¯i (i ∈ {1, . . . , 264}) is a measured value for each sensor when noise is
not injected, respectively. We note that xi is variable of time; our capacitance logger sampled the
raw values at the rate of 7 times per second. In contrast, x¯i was set as a static value, which was
collected when no signal was injected. If no noise signal is applied, ∆ becomes roughly 20 when
there are no touch events on the screen and ∆ becomes greater than 250 when a finger touches the
screen. Thus, the metric ∆ can measure the impact of noise interference.
We measured∆, applying noise signal to the copper sheet with three different voltages (20 Vpp,
70Vpp, and 120Vpp) and frequencies, ranging from 5 kHz to 300 kHz. Figure 5.2 shows the
results. We first notice that there are clear peaks at the frequency of 90 kHz. This result indicates
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Fig. 5.3 Coordinates of the touch points reported by the touchscreen controller. The injected
signals had three different voltage values. The frequency was set to 90 kHz. Left: 20 Vpp,
Center: 70 Vpp, Right: 120 Vpp
that there is a characteristic frequency of noise that can affect the touch controller. As we will
study in the next section, this frequency differs for different models of touchscreen controllers.
So, specifying the model of the target is crucial to succeeding in attacking. As we have seen, the
device fingerprinting technique can be used for this purpose. We also notice that the effect of noise
becomes larger with higher voltage in the signals.
5.2.3 Spatial distribution of the false touch events
We now study the positions of the touch events caused by the noise signals. In this experiment,
nothing touches the screen. Using our monitoring software, we record touch positions for 30 sec-
onds with the sampling rate of two samples per second. The touchscreen has an 800×480 resolution
and supports a 10-point multi-touch.
We used three different voltages (20 Vpp, 70 Vpp, and 120 Vpp) and the following two represen-
tative frequencies: 60 kHz as a frequency not affecting ∆ and 90 kHz as a frequency affecting ∆
the most. As expected, the touchscreen does not report any touch events with the 60 kHz frequency.
In the followings, we omit the results of 60 kHz frequency. Figure 5.3 shows the results for 90 kHz
frequency. First, we notice that the touchscreen controller did not recognize touch events when the
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Fig. 5.5 Common-mode noise and normal-mode noise.
voltage was set to 20 Vpp. We also see that higher voltage signals cause false touch events more
frequently. Second, we see intrinsic spatial patterns of touch events, i.e., they linearly spread out
on the screen*1. We also see that many touch events are focused on the top or bottom edges of the
screen panel. These observations indicate that even if an attacker waits for a long time, it seems
unlikely that a false touch is fired at target coordinates with a high probability, given the skewed
spatial distribution.
5.2.4 Limiting the dispersion with a real touch event
After several trials, we found that touching on a screen can fix the skewed spatial distribution of
false touches. Although not conclusive due to the “black box” nature of the touchscreen controllers,
we conjecture that the touching with a finger stabilizes the area of capacitive coupling. The good
feature of this phenomenon is that while touching on a screen makes the distribution focused on a
certain area, it still keeps scattering the touch events; thus, it can create false touch events in a more
predictable way.
We repeated the similar experiments but added a finger touch this time. Figure 5.4 shows the
*1 As we will see in the next section, the direction of the spread patterns differs for different models of touchscreen
controllers; i.e., horizontal spread or vertical spread.
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experiment results. Under the low voltage signal of 20 Vpp, the false touch events occur only if
a finger touches the screen. More importantly, we can see that the positions of the false touches
are centered on the line where the true touch point is located. It was also seen that the direction of
the line did not change even when we placed the touchscreen at different angles, suggesting that
the attack is tolerant to the random placement of the device. The line was formed along the RX
electrodes of the touchscreen consistently; the mechanism of the phenomenon will be discussed
later. These are desirable characteristics because usually, GUI buttons are aligned in a row; e.g.,
CONNECT/CANCEL, YES/NO, or OK/CANCEL. Therefore, an attacker can expect that a touch
event will be scattered on a wrong button, with a probability of 1/2, with an assumption that the
touch events are uniformly scattered along a line. We note that screen orientation also matters. If a
screen is in portrait mode, scattered touch events along the vertical line may not produce a touch on
the targeted button. As we show in Chapter 6, the direction of scattered touch events differ among
the different models. By making use of the device fingerprinting techniques, an attacker can obtain
the information about the model as well as the current screen orientation; these information will be
used to check whether or not Ghost Touch Generator is effective.
5.3 Attack Mechanism Insight
As shown in Figure 5.5, based on how a noise source is connected to a circuit, electric noise can
be classified into the two types: common-mode noise and normal-mode noise. While common-
mode noise does not affect the voltage across a passive element such as a resistor and a capacitor,
normal-mode noise does change it. It is known that a touchscreen of a smartphone can malfunction
due to the normal-mode noise signals, which are leaked from the smartphone’s battery charger or
LCD screen [13]. The phenomenon is caused by the fact that normal-mode component of the noise
signals will affect δQ, which is proportional to the amount of current changes measured with the
touchscreen controller; i.e., δQ = C × δV . Recall that C denotes the capacitance between the TX
and RX electrodes and δQ denotes the amount of current changes. δV denotes the changes of the
voltage across the capacitor; i.e., δV is the voltage induced by the normal-mode noise. Thus, even
though the capacitance, C, has not been changed, the touchscreen controller will detect the change
of current as a false touch.
Touchscreen controller manufacturers have developed countermeasures against the electromag-
netic interference (EMI) caused by the weak noise, which is applied to a touchscreen controller
unintentionally from the internal circuit; e.g., those emanating from a battery charger or an LCD
screen. However, as we have experimented, if a strong noise signal is intentionally applied to a
touchscreen controller, it will affect δQ, and the change will be detected as a false touch. The key
idea of Ghost Touch Generator was to cause an intentional malfunction by injecting intentional
noise signals externally. We found that producing large alternating voltages at a specific frequency
near a touchscreen can cause a malfunction through capacitive coupling with the RX electrodes.
Based on the discussion so far, we now attempt to answer the following research questions, which
are raised through our experiments.
• How does “a real touch event” change the dispersion area, i.e., from Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.4?
• Why are the invoked false touches scattered along the RX electrodes, which are actually touched?
Figure 5.6 shows the two diagrams of the circuits that express the high-level behavior of a touch-
screen controller when the external noise signal is injected. Unlike Figure 2.1, there is a noise
source between the drive voltage source and the ground. This noise source expresses the alternat-
ing current applied to the copper sheet, which is electrostatically coupled with the touchscreen.
When an RX electrode is not touched by a finger (left circuit of Figure 5.6), the noise source will
27
CHAPTER 5. GHOST TOUCH GENERATOR
VRCf
C0
noise
source
TX electrodes
finger
Copper
Sheet
Not being touched
Not being touched
Being touched
VR
C0
noise
source
Being touchedNot being touched
Fig. 5.6 Diagrams of the circuits that express the high-level behavior of a touchscreen con-
troller when noise signal is injected: Top: the circuit of a touchscreen controller, Left: the
equivalent circuit when an RX electrode is not touched by a finger, Right: the equivalent circuit
when an RX electrode is touched by a finger.
not affect the voltage measured at the RX electrode because the noise source only changes the
ground voltage of the entire touchscreen circuit. The circuit is similar to the one shown in the left
circuit of Figure 5.5, i.e., the applied noise appears as common mode. Therefore, the δQ will not
change, and false touches will not appear on the corresponding RX electrodes.
In contrast, when an RX electrode is touched by a finger, the noise source will affect the voltage
measured at the RX electrode, which is touched by the finger. As shown in the right circuit of
Figure 5.6, the noise source is connected to the RX electrode through the capacitance of the human
body. The circuit is similar to the one shown in the right circuit of Figure 5.5; i.e., normal mode
noise is applied to the circuit. Therefore, the δQ will change, and false touches will appear on the
corresponding RX electrodes.
The above observations lead us to the following conclusion; the external noise signals injected
by the Ghost Touch Generator affect the current measured at each RX electrode in a different way;
i.e., appears as common mode noise when an RX electrode is not touched by a finger or normal
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mode noise when an RX electrode is touched by a finger. Thus, false touches appear only on the
lines corresponding to the RX electrodes which are actually touched. This conclusion is supported
by the fact that the false touch line in Figure 5.4 is in parallel with the RX electrodes of the actual
touchscreen we used in the experiment.
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Chapter 6 Technical Feasibility
Assessments
To evaluate the technical feasibility of Tap ’n Ghost, we performed two studies, which aim to
verify that NFC tags embedded inside a common object can be actually read by smartphones and
to verify the success of Ghost Touch Generator attack.
6.1 Maximum NFC Reading Distance
For this study, we use 24 Android smartphones/tablets, which are manufactured by the 12 differ-
ent vendors. We study the maximum NFC reading distance of the smartphones to demonstrate the
validity of the idea of embedding malicious NFC tags in a physical object. An NFC tag is attached
to the backside of the wood board of the walnut material. We read the tag using the smartphones
placed on the backside. We measured the maximum communicable distance by changing the thick-
ness of the wood board at intervals of 5 mm and recording the success of reading the tag. We found
that the maximum NFC reading distance was 3.4 cm in average. The maximum and minimum of
the measured distance were 5.0 cm and 2.0 cm, respectively*1. If we consider the thickness of a
table top, we can conclude that the measured maximum distance is large enough to establish the
attacks by Tap ’n Ghost.
6.2 Conditions of the successful Ghost Touch Generator.
We now empirically study the conditions for the successful attacks. For this study, we use 7
Android smartphones/tablets listed in Table 6.1*2. As our amplifier is not capable of generating
Table 6.1 The conditions of the successful Ghost Touch Generator attack. The direction of the
scattering patterns is defined when a screen is set in portrait mode.
Device Manufacture Success
false touches
Frequency
[kHz]
Voltage
[Vpp]
Success attack
rates
Scattering
patterns
Nexus 7 ASUS ✓ 128.2 40.0 18/30 vertical
ARROWS NX F-05F FUJITSU — — — —
Nexus 9 HTC ✓ 280.9 490.0 0/10 horizontal
Galaxy S6 edge SAMSUNG — — — —
Galaxy S4 SAMSUNG ✓ 384.5 70.4 13/30 horizontal
AQUOS ZETA SH-04F SHARP ✓ 202.0 700.0 0/10 horizontal
Xperia Z4 SONY ✓ 218.0 340.0 20/30 horizontal
*1 For reference, the full results are shown in Table C.3 (Appendix).
*2 We rented 17 devices for the experiment of measuring NFC reading distance, however, we were not able to use these
devices for the experiments of Ghost Touch Generator because applying the attack has a risk of causing physical
damages on the devices.
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Fig. 6.1 Block diagram and photos of setup for observing effect of alternating current on off-
the-shelf smartphones
voltage greater than 150 Vpp, which was smaller than the effective voltage needed to successful
attacks, we used a high-voltage transformer taken out of a plasma ball. When the attack device gen-
erates the highest/lowest voltage (700V/30V) shown in Table 6.1, it consumed 26W/6W, indicating
that the power consumption of the attack device is small.
Figure 6.1 shows the setup of the experiments. The smartphone and the copper sheet are insulated
with the polycarbonate plate of 5 mm thick. We first employ device fingerprinting by following the
procedure shown in Chapter 4. The fingerprint information can be used to identify the characteristic
frequencies for the smartphones to cause the malfunctions. For the smartphones that had caused
malfunctions, we will further test the following tasks.
We created an NFC tag that requests the Bluetooth pairing. A smartphone that read the tag will
pop up a dialog message, “Are you sure want to pair the Bluetooth device? (NO, YES).” We
then touch the button of “NO.” Before the smartphone reads the tag, we have applied Ghost Touch
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Generator. We will see whether the actual touch becomes “YES” (attack succeeded) or “NO”
(attack failed).
Sometimes, we do not see any responses even though we touch the button due to the noise
injection. In such cases, if there are no responses back after the five consecutive touches, we
count it as a failure of the attack. Also, if the patterns of the touch scattering for a device has a
horizontal/vertical direction, we set the orientation of the device to portrait/landscape.
Table 6.1 summarizes the results. For the 5 out of 7 models, we specified the characteristic
frequencies and voltage values that can cause malfunction, i.e., “false touch.” Of the 5 models that
cause malfunctions, 3 models succeeded in attacking with probabilities distributed around 1/2; i.e.,
the OS detected the touch for a wrong button and the device was paired with a Bluetooth device.
The rest of 2 models worked as follows. For Nexus 9, the detected touch events were biased to
a specific area, which was not close to the buttons; thus, the attacks failed. For AQUOS ZETA
SH-04F, when a finger touched somewhere in the right/left half of the screen, the false touches
appeared on the left/right half on the screen; thus, the attacks failed. Thus, the patterns of false
touches depend on the models. There were two models that did not generate false touch events;
the one that the detected touch events lag behind the finger’s touch (Galaxy S 6 edge) and the one
that does not recognize the touch at all (ARROWS NX F-05F). We also found that Ghost Touch
Generator works at a distance much longer than maximum NFC reading distance – 5.0 cm. This
observation indicates that the Ghost Touch Generator will succeed within the range in which the
TAP attack succeeds*3.
*3 Interested readers can refer to the movies (available at https://goo.gl/xoVt23) for clarification.
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Chapter 7 Practicality of the
Threat
In this chapter, we first evaluate the practicality of the threat using a Tap ’n Ghost attack by
testing the three assumptions made concerning a victim of this attack:
A1: Has an Android smartphone equipped with NFC,
A2: Has enabled NFC functionality on the smartphone, and
A3: Has unlocked the screen of the smartphone when she or he brings the smartphone close to a
Tap ’n Ghost-installed object.
We then assess the real world impact of the attack based on the statistics derived from our user
study and discuss the cost needed to perform the end-to-end attack. Finally, we describe two
possible attack scenarios to clarify the practicality of the attack.
7.1 Validity of A1 (Device constraint)
The assumption A1 limits the target of the attack on Android smartphones/tablets. We note that
as the share of Android in the smartphone OS market is 85% [14], the number of potential target
devices is large.
Online survey: To test the assumption A1, we performed an online survey with 300 participants.
We recruited participants who own Android smartphones. In Table 7.1, the population of the par-
ticipants is shown. We used a crowdsourcing platform to recruit them. To complete the full survey,
it took roughly two days.
In the survey, we asked whether or not the participants’ smartphones were equipped with NFC.
To ensure the accuracy of the response, the questionnaire included a description that showed how
to confirm the presence of NFC functionality on a smartphone. More specifically, we put a question
that asked participants to report their device names/versions, which we used to check the validity of
responses. Of the 300 participants, 214 participants answered that their smartphones were equipped
with NFC. We also analyzed the product names of smartphones reported by the participants, and
found that their responses were consistent.
In addition to the observations derived from the online survey, there are several facts that support
the assumption A1. It is forecasted that NFC market will grow at the rate of 17.5% during 2018 to
2023 due to the increased volume of mobile/contactless payments [15]. Also, it has been forecasted
Table 7.1 Demography of respondents (online survey).
Age (Years)
# gender 10–29 30–49 50–
F: 149 M:150 Other: 1 107 169 24
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that the shipments of Android NFC-enabled smartphones will reach 844 million in 2018 [8]. These
facts indicate that the potential target of Tap ’n Ghost attacks is increasingly becoming ubiquitous.
7.2 Validity of A2 (NFC availability)
Tap ’n Ghost will not succeed unless the NFC is enabled on the victim’s smartphone. To verify
the assumption A2, we manually investigated 24 smartphones listed in Table C.3. We found that
the NFC was enabled in the factory settings in 16 out of 24 models. Interestingly, in more recent
models, the NFC is enabled in the factory settings. We also note that the NFC-based mobile
payment has become increasingly popular over the past several years. For instance, a report [16]
predicts that in 2021, NFC or other mobile payment technologies will generate close to 190 billion
U.S. dollars in transaction value. Another report [17] reports that in 2018, more than one-third of
smartphone users ages 14 and older will use a smartphone to pay for a purchase at a POS at least
once every six months. The widespread of NFC-based mobile payment will incentivise smartphone
users to always turn on the NFC functionality on their devices.
Online survey: To complement the observations on the NFC availability, we tested our assumption
by using an online survey, which was a continuation of the previous one. To the participants who
answered that their smartphones were equipped with NFC in the previous question, we asked them
when they usually enable the NFC functionality. Of the 214 participants, 48 participants answered
that they always enable the NFC functionality, and 11 answered that they occasionally turn on the
NFC functionality. In total, roughly one-fourth of the participants with NFC-powered smartphones
made use of NFC functionality in their daily lives.
7.3 Validity of A3 (Human behavior)
To verify the assumption A3, which is a factor related to human behavior, we conducted a user
study, following the threat model shown in Chapter 3.
Scenario: In this experiment, we simulated a situation where a person is studying or doing paper-
work at a public space such as a library or a cafe, and an attacker has embedded a Tap ’n Ghost
system in a table installed in the library or cafe. While the person is studying, she or he may want
to use a smartphone for several purposes, for instance, looking up a word, searching on the web, or
using a calculator app. We also simulated a situation where a person with a smartphone is taking a
break at a table.
Design/policy of the study: Our experiment is a deceptive study by nature, which means that we
did not inform participants in advance that our true objective was to test the assumption A3. Thus,
they did not know that there were some equipment embedded in the table on which they were
performing the given tasks. We designed our experiments such that the participants were treated
fairly and with due consideration of their rights. In light of this policy, we did not install any
malicious NFC tags nor Ghost Touch Generator. Instead, we tried to test the assumption in a non-
intrusive way; that is, we embedded multiple NFC reader/writers into a table to sense the status of
NFC-equipped smartphones. Using the measurement technique described later, we can determine
whether the smartphone is locked or not when it is brought close to the measurement system. We
note that as shown in Chapter 6, Ghost Touch Generator will succeed within the range in which the
TAP attack succeeds; i.e., if a unlocked smartphone is brought close enough to be sensed with our
measurement system, the smartphone will be successfully attacked by Ghost Touch Generator with
the succeeding probability shown in Table 6.1.
Participants: We recruited 16 participants who owned NFC-equipped Android smartphones. To
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Table 7.2 Demography of the participants (user study).
Generation
# Gender 10’s 20’s 30’s
F: 7 M: 9 5 10 1
Table
Table top (MDF)
NFC Reader/Writers
Laptop
Fig. 7.1 Smartphone status monitoring system embedded in a wooden table.
search for participants, we used a web-based announcement system of our institution. An inter-
ested person directly contacted us using e-mail as a communication channel. Before enrolling a
participant into the experiment, we checked whether they own NFC-equipped Android devices in
the following way. We first asked participants whether their phone has NFC functionality and if
yes, what their settings were. To do so, we provide an instruction so that they can check it easily.
Table 7.2 shows the population of the participants. They were undergraduate or graduate stu-
dents studying at a university. Of the 16 participants, only one majored in computer science; the
remaining students majored in various fields such as other science and engineering disciplines, lit-
erature, sports science, education, and commerce. The reward for the participants was 20 USD per
person. The length of entire session was roughly 40 minutes per participant.
Experimental Setup: We have developed the smartphone status monitoring system, which consists
of 16 NFC reader/writers and a laptop connected to them (see Figure 7.1). This system is embed-
ded in a wooden table. For reference, detailed technical descriptions of the system are shown in
Appendix. This monitoring system can be used to test the assumption A3; hence, it senses an NFC-
equipped smartphone put on the table and detects whether the smartphone is unlocked (attackable)
or locked (un-attackable) by analyzing the NFC communication. As the system uses NFC commu-
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Fig. 7.2 Results of user study.
nication as a means of detecting the status of a smartphone, it is clear that a smartphone detected as
unlocked can be attacked with the Tap ’n Ghost. We note that this monitoring system can be turned
into a TAP-installed table if we configure it as such.
User study procedure: The experiment consisted of the three sessions:
Session 1 Quiz (15 mins)
In this session, the aim was to simulate a situation in which a person had to use a smartphone while
she or he was working on a task at a public place. Participants were asked to write the answers
to the quizzes written on a paper. At the time of recruiting, we informed the participants that the
objective of this experiment was to observe how a person makes use of a smartphone when she or
he needs to search for information. As we focused on testing the assumption A3 in this study, we
designed our experiment assuming that other assumptions A1 and A2 had been established; these
two assumptions have been verified in the previous sections. To achieve this condition, we asked
the participants to enable NFC functionality during the experiment. To make the context of NFC
natural, we informed the participants that NFC is used for recording check-in/out times and asked
them to touch the NFC tags we provided with their smartphones at the beginning and ending of
the experiment. We note that we did not inform users to unlock the smartphone (except when they
needed to unlock the smartphone to read the check-in/out NFC tags), because our objective was to
check whether or not a person brings their device close to the table in an unlocked status.
During the session, participants used their smartphones when they answered the quiz questions.
To emulate a scenario described before, we created quizzes such as “Write the names of the three
kings who owned their pyramid complex at Giza.” Consequently, most of participants had to search
the Internet to get the correct answer; it will emulate the situation in which a person is studying at
a public place and used their smartphone to lookup something.
Session 2 Break time (10 mins)
In this session, the aim was to simulate a situation in which a person who brings a smartphone is
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seated at a table. In contrast to the previous session, we did not force the participants to use their
smartphones. After the Session 1 concluded, we asked participants to remain seated at the table
while we were preparing for the next session and left them the room. We provided them with tea
and snacks to put them in a relaxed state.
Session 3 Debriefing (10 mins)
In the debriefing session, we first disclosed the true purpose of this study and the reason why we
had to deceive the participants. We did not receive any negative feedback on the deceptive aspect
of the study. We then asked a series of questions to understand how they actually behaved during
the experiment. We also asked them to examine their smartphones to get detailed spec information.
Results: In Figure 7.2, the results of these activities are shown. We first note that there were several
exceptions (marked as “not available”) as follows. Among the 16 participants, P7 owned a device
that did not respond to the probes sent from the NFC readers. The device was a Huawei Honor
8. When it receives a probing command, it pops up a window of Huawei Pay without sending
back any commands. As we will discuss in Chapter 8, this type of user approval process can be
an effective countermeasure against the threats caused by a malicious NFC tag. P2, P13, and P15
misunderstood our instruction and disabled NFC after they completed the first session. We also
note that P12 and P15 completed the quiz task within 15 mins. In the following, we eliminate the
corresponding “Not Available” time marked with grey color in Fig. 7.2 from the analysis.
In the Session 1, all the participants presented opportunities to be attacked within 15 mins. Most
of the participants reported in the debriefing session that she or he had unlocked her or his smart-
phone and put it on the table when she or he looked up something using the smartphone. As the
participants needed to work on quizzes, it is natural that they behaved in that way.
In the Session 2, 10 out of 12 participants presented opportunities to be attacked within 10
mins. Interestingly, while the participants were taking a break, the majority of them used their
smartphones on the table. This result indicates that Tap ’n Ghost is also effective for a person who
is not studying, but taking a break at a table. Two participants who did not present opportunities
to be attacked during the break time reported that they were either eating snacks or using their
smartphones keeping a distance from the table top. We note that there were no participants who
noticed that there was our measurement system inside the table.
Summary: To summarize, the results obtained through our user study demonstrates that there are
scenarios in which the assumptionA3 holds; i.e., in our experiments, most of participants presented
opportunities to be attacked during the sessions.
7.4 Attack Impact
Based on the survey results, we assess the real world impact of Tap ’n Ghost.
Number of potential target devices: First, we attempt to estimate the number of devices/users that
could be compromised by our attack. The number of NFC-enabled Android smartphones will reach
N=844 million by 2018 [8]. We use this number as a baseline. As we have shown in the validity
of A2, we revealed that roughly q1 = 1/4 of users with NFC-enabled Android smartphones turn
on NFC daily. Also, in the validity of A3, we revealed that q2 = 10/12 of participants exhibited
attackable opportunities when they use smartphones at a table in which Tap?n Ghost could be
installed (free time scenario). Assuming that q3 = 1/10 of users may use their smartphones at a
public table, the rough estimation of the attackable target devices is N × q1 × q2 × q3 = 23.4
million, which is a significant number. We note that the estimate of q3 may be conservative.
Success probability of a single attack: Next, we attempt to estimate the success probability of
a single attack for the attack scenario described in Section 3.3 (Malicious Table). To succeed in
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Fig. 7.3 The attack parameters (n,m) vs. attack success probability.
attacking, the following conditions must be satisfied:
C1: The smartphone comes with Android OS.
C2: The smartphone is equipped with NFC.
C3: The victim has enabled the NFC functionality.
C4: The smartphone’s touchscreen controller is attackable with Ghost Touch Generator.
C5: The victim has unlocked the smartphone when she or he brings it close to theMalicious Table.
C6: Ghost Touch Generator attack has succeeded.
In the followings, for each of the above conditions, Ci, we attempt to estimate the probability, pi
that the condition is satisfied.
As we have shown in the validity of A1, Android’s share in the smartphone OS market is
85% [14]. Therefore, we can estimate p1 as p1 = 0.85. Furthermore, as we already have shown in
the validity of A1 and A2, we can estimate p2 and p3 as p2 = 214/300 and p3 = 1/4, respectively.
From the results shown in Table 6.1, we estimate p4 as p4 = 3/7. As we have shown in the validity
of A3, p5 can be estimated as p5 = 10/12 (free time scenario). Finally, as discussed in Section 5.2,
C6 will be satisfied with a probability of p6 = 1/2. The success probability of a single attack is
calculated as the joint probability; i.e., p = p1 × p2 × p3 × p4 × p5 × p6 = 0.03.
Overall attack success probability: Although the success probability of a single attack is not high,
there are several opportunities to carry out an attack on each victim as we have shown in Figure 7.2.
That is, an attacker can retry the attack. In addition, as a Malicious Table is installed in a public
space, the attacker can target many users. That is, even if the attacks on a victim were all failed, the
attacker could wait for another victim who will take a seat at the table.
Based on the observations, we estimate the probability that the Tap ’n Ghost attack is succeeded
at least once within a period of time. Here is a generalized scenario:
• n persons with their smartphones will take a seat at the Malicious Table within a period of time
(say, one day).
• For each person, the Malicious Table can perform the attackm times.
The overall attack success probability is estimated as
pA(n,m) =
1− (1− 5∏
j=1
pi)
n
 (1− (1− p6)m) ,
which is a probability that the attack is succeeded at least once within a period of time.
Figure 7.3 shows how the parameters (n,m) affects the attack success probability. As we see, in-
creasing the number of retries,m, effectively increases the attack success probability. For instance,
if an attacker can retry the Ghost Touch Generator for m = 3 times, she or he can establish the
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success probability of 0.71 when n = 30 persons visit the table within a period of time. We also
note that the attacker can increase the number of theMalicious Tables if they want to accelerate the
speed of succeeding attacks. The cost of implementing the attack device will be discussed in the
next section.
7.5 Implementation Cost
To implement a Malicious Table, an attacker needs to build two systems, TAP and Ghost Touch
Generator, and install them under the table top. A TAP device consists of the following devices:
NFC reader/writers, a small computer, and a battery pack. For the user study described in Chapter 7,
we used 16 NFC readers/writers and a laptop PC to implement a TAP device. For the real attack
setup, we can replace the laptop PC with a small computer, such as Raspberry Pi. A Ghost Touch
Generator consists of the following devices: a DDS signal generator, a high-voltage transformer, a
copper sheet, a small computer, and a battery pack. Note that a small computer and a battery pack
can be shared with the TAP device.
In total, the cost for implementing a Malicious Table is roughly 490 USD, i.e., 320 USD for 16
NFC reader/writers, 20 USD for a DDS signal generator, 6 USD for a high-voltage transformer, 4
USD for a copper sheet, 40 USD for single-board computer, and 100 USD for a battery pack.
7.6 Attack Scenarios
Finally, we describe two possible attack scenarios of Tap ’n Ghost. We also discuss the feasibility
of the attack on the basis of the attack success probabilities we derived.
Attacking random targets: In this scenario, an attacker will set up a malicious table at a public
space such as a 24/7 dining cafe or library. An attacker can expect to have many potential victims
take a seat at a table and use their smartphones on it; which will lead to the success of the attack.
Following the attack success rate, shown in Figure 7.3, an attacker can increase the expected number
of attack successes, as she/he leaves the table for a long time. For instance, if we assumem = 10,
the attack will succeed, with the probability close to 1, for at least one victim out of n = 30 mass
targets. As the attack setup keeps running, the number of attack successes will linearly increase
over time.
Attacking the specific targets: In this scenario, an attacker will set up a malicious desk at a tar-
geted place, such as an office or open space of a company. The attack targets a specific group
of people or individuals, rather than randomly-selected individuals who visit a public space. An
attacker will bring a pre-installed malicious desk to the office, by pretending to be a freight for-
warder. Alternatively, an attacker can ship pre-installed malicious desks, as an online equipment
supplier. Of course, the setup requires an additional cost. However, as this is a targeted attack, even
the success of a single attack has significant value for an attacker, e.g., stealing the confidential
information of a company, or succeeding in an impersonation attack, in order to further employ an
advanced and persistent threat attack. Again, the attack success probability can be seen in Fig. 7.3.
This time, the number of potential targets will be limited as the malicious desk is placed in a private
space. However, as the group of targets will have several opportunities to take a seat at the table
in several days, an attacker can expect to have large n over time; e.g., the targets will take a seat
at the table for n = 30 times in total, which is large enough to establish the high attack success
probability.
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Chapter 8 Discussion
In this chapter, we first discuss the possible defenses against the threats of the Tap ’n Ghost
attacks. Next, we discuss the ethical considerations.
8.1 Countermeasures
We now discuss possible countermeasures against the threat of Tap ’n Ghost attacks. We divide
the discussion into three groups according to three key components.
NFC: The simplest and the most effective defense is to add/improve the user approval processes
before Android OS launches applications recorded in a tag. The user approval processes adopted
by iOS can increase the security of NFC-based services, i.e., the latest iPhones (iPhone XS, XS
Max, and XR) that perform operations written in NFC tags only when user approval is provided*1.
We note, however, by adding the extra user approval process, the usability of NFC-powered services
has been sacrificed to some extent. A good example of establishing both usability and security for
the approval process of NFC service is Huawei Pay, which requires a fingerprint authentication for
each NFC payment transaction.
Even though a usable approval process for reading NFC tags is widely introduced in future,
the threats caused by a deceptive pop-up message remains. To mitigate such threats, Android OS
should change the format of messages associated with NDEF records. By explicitly presenting the
reason why an operation is invoked, it will thwart the threats caused by deceptive messages.
Touchscreen: While conducting the experiments described in Chapter 6, we noted that some touch-
screen controllers stopped working when a strong electric field was applied. Although these ob-
servations are not conclusive, we conjecture that the manufactures of these controllers may have
installed mechanisms to stop the controllers upon detection of external noises. In fact, as Ref. [13]
reported, manufactures of touchscreen controllers have developed techniques for dealing with the
noise that can interfere with capacitive touch sensing. Incorporating such mechanisms will lead to
eliminating the threats of Ghost Touch Generator. In addition, as Kune et al. proposed in Ref. [18],
there are several analog/digital countermeasures against intentional EMI attacks, e.g., a filter that
attenuates external noise signals and signal processing to eliminate anomalous inputs. These tech-
niques will also be useful as countermeasures against the threats of Ghost Touch Generator.
Objects: It is almost impossible to visually detect a Tap ’n Ghost system because it is embedded
into physical objects. However, there may be situations where law enforcement agencies want to
inspect physical objects such as desks inside a building to investigate whether a Tap ’n Ghost has
been installed. An active probe that searches for NFC tags should be developed to make this task
easier. For this purpose, it is also possible to build a Tap ’n Ghost honeypot that behaves as an
NFC-enabled smartphone. The drawback of this approach is that it is not scalable because the
practical working distance range of NFC is at most about 4 cm. Further research is needed to shed
more light on this problem.
*1 Older iOS smartphones read NFC tags only when they receive requests from the foreground apps.
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8.2 Ethical considerations
As several researchers have reported, the threat of attacks using malicious NFC tags is publicly
known [2–7]. Several groups such as the NFC Security Awareness Project andW3C have addressed
the danger of reading unknown NFC tags [6, 19]. The objective of our work was to explore the
threats of malicious NFC tags by embedding them into common objects. As we have demonstrated,
the threats of malicious NFC tags become further viable through Tap ’n Ghost. On the other hand,
our work studied the threat of active attacks against touchscreens. We are taking active steps to
notify related vendors of the risk with the aid of JPCERT/CC. In addition, we provide possible
countermeasures that will remedy the threats. We hope that our paper will be informative to further
enhance the security of NFC-powered smartphones and touchscreens.
All our experiments involving human subjects followed the guidelines provided by our institu-
tion. Although our experiments were not designed to collect any privacy-sensitive information, we
provided participants with an informed consent such that they could make a decision as to whether
or not they wanted to be involved. We were concerned that participants of our user study would not
behave naturally if we disclosed the true objectives of the experiment in advance. Therefore, we
carefully designed a deceptive study so that we can minimize any risks. All the participants were
thoroughly debriefed at the end of the study. We did not receive any negative feedback from the
participants.
8.3 Open research question
As we mentioned in the introduction chapter, our work is the first to demonstrate the threat of
active attack against touchscreens. Along this line, there is an interesting open research question.
As the touchscreen has become a standard user interface that is now used for several critical appli-
cations, such as e-voting, equipment manipulation at factories, and public transportation systems,
the results obtained through our research imply that we need to have mechanisms that can verify the
correctness of the analog signal that serves as input to touchscreen-equipped systems. Thus, how
externally injected signals affect the generic touchscreen interfaces and their possible countermea-
sures remain an open research question. There are many promising avenues for further research.
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Chapter 9 Related Work
Attacks using NFC: There have been several studies on the threats of attacks using NFC technol-
ogy [2–7]. Miller [5] reported that malicious NFC tags can attack browser exploits and NFC stack
bugs that existed at the time. Gold et al. [7] demonstrated a phishing attack that uses a smart poster
with malicious NFC tag attached. The accessed website prompts users to log in to a fake SNS site.
They also demonstrated that an attacker can write a malicious file to the victim’s device by using
the peer-to-peer mode of NFC. Wall of Sheep [6] demonstrated the experiment using NFC tags at-
tached to smart posters and buttons at the DEFCON venue. At the venue, they put posters that say
“Find a Wall of Sheep button and scan it with your NFC phone for exclusive discounts, tools and
surprises every day.” They reported that about 50 attendees scanned the NFC tags that “could” have
been malicious tags. These studies assumed that an attacker can come close enough to a victim, or
the victim intentionally read the malicious NFC tag by using posters or other existing facilities.
Our approach is different from these prior studies in that ours can achieve complex and tailored
attacks by leveraging NFC card emulation.
RFID tags: NFC is a specialized subset within the family of radio frequency identification (RFID)
technology. Several researchers have studied the risk of RFID tags that can be attached to various
things [20, 21]. Baldini et al. [20] reported the application of RFID tags in the retail sector and
discussed associated privacy issues and countermeasures. Juels published a survey paper on the
research of privacy and security of RFID [21]. The survey examined the privacy protection mech-
anisms and integrity assurance in RFID systems. In the paper, Juels mentioned the importance of
user perception of security and privacy in RFID systems as users cannot see RF emissions. The
indication is closely related the problem we addressed in this paper.
Attacks on touchscreen: There have been many studies on the side-channel attacks on touch-
screens (LCDs); Aviv et al. [22] used smudge left on the screen to infer a graphical password,
Maggi et al. [23] used the data collected from a surveillance camera to recognize keystrokes of a
victim, and Hayashi et al. [24] used electromagnetic emanation to reconstruct a victim’s tablet dis-
play. To the best of our knowledge, while these attacks passively steal data from the touchscreen,
our Ghost Touch Generator is the first attack that actively radiates signals toward touchscreen to
cause targeted malfunctions.
We note that there have been several works that studied how electromagnetic interference (EMI)
affects devices. For instance, Kune et al. [18] studied the susceptibility of analog sensor systems to
signal injection attacks by intentional, low-power emission of chosen electromagnetic waveforms.
While their study attacked implantable medical devices and consumer electronic devices containing
microphones, ours is the first to attack touchscreen controllers with EMI.
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Chapter 10 Conclusion
We introduced a novel proof-of-concept attack named Tap ’n Ghost, which targets NFC-enabled
smartphones. To fully explore the threats of Tap ’n Ghost, we developed two striking techniques:
Tag-based Adaptive Ploy and Ghost Touch Generator, which enable an attacker to carry out various
severe and sophisticated attacks without being perceived by the device owner who unintentionally
puts the device close to a Tap ’n Ghost-installed object. Through the extensive experiments using
off-the-shelf smartphones, we demonstrated that the proposed attacks work in practice. Besides,
our study including an online survey and a user study demonstrated that the threat caused by the
attack is realistic. Although our attack is a proof-of-concept, we provide possible countermeasures
that will thwart the threats. We believe that the concept of our attacks sheds new light on the
security research of mobile/IoT devices.
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A Electrical Touch Attack
In the main body of the paper, we have assumed that the NFC controller is mounted on the rear
side of the smartphone, and Ghost Touch Generator attacks the touchscreen from the rear side.
However, there are several smartphones/tablets that mount the NFC controller on the front side of
the devices; e.g., Nexus 10, Xperia XZ, and ZenFone 3 Deluxe. These mobile devices read NFC
tags on the same side with its touchscreen.
For this type of devices, an attacker can trigger arbitrary touch events by directly touching the
screen when a victim puts the device on a Tap ’n Ghost-installed table with the touchscreen down.
An attacker installs a simple circuit with plate electrodes on the surface of table – embedding the
circuit in the table top. We implemented such a circuit as shown in Figure A.1.
The circuit works as follows. The plate electrodes on the circuit capacitively couple with the
TX electrodes of the touchscreen when the circuit gets close enough to the touchscreen. The ca-
Raspberry Pi
Relay
Metal plates
flip
Metal plates Blind sheet
(ex. woodgrained paper)
Smartphone
Touchscreen
Fig. A.1 A circuit board that triggers the electrical touches.
A. ELECTRICAL TOUCH ATTACK
pacitance between one of the electrodes on the circuit and TX electrodes becomes low when the
circuit electrodes are disconnected from anywhere and becomes high when the circuit electrodes are
grounded or connected to an object that has large electric capacitance. By systemizing this mecha-
nism, an attacker can virtually touch an arbitrary position by relaying a corresponding electrode to
the ground or the object with a large capacitance.
The circuit shown in Figure A.1 has a 0.8-cm2 of square plate electrode. If we implement several
plate electrodes that are placed 0.2 cm away from each other, the resolution of touch becomes
1.0 cm. The area of plate electrode of the circuit is proportional to the capacitance between the
electrode of the circuit and touchscreen. Therefore, plate electrodes that are too small cannot
create enough change of capacitance by grounding it. However, an attacker could obtain finer
resolution by using circuits used for active styluses, which actively interrupt field coupling between
the electrodes of the touchscreen.
An attacker can make use of this attack as follows: An attacker first employs the device fin-
gerprinting to know that the device has the NFC controller at front side. Using the website, the
attacker can obtain the information about the device orientation using the web API interface. Using
the position of the used NFC tag and the orientation information, the attacker can estimate the area
of the touchscreen. Finally, an attacker can pinpoint the position of the button for establishing the
attack and make the electrical touch by grounding the corresponding plate electrode.
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B Smartphone Status Monitoring
System
By carefully analyzing communication between a smartphone and the NFC devices, the system
can detect the status of the smartphones, i.e., whether they are locked or unlocked. The key idea of
the monitoring system is to leverage the observation that if a smartphone with host card emulation
(HCE) enabled is unlocked and receives a SEL_REQ command with P2P bit set from a NFC reader.
The system periodically probes a smartphone by sending a SEL_REQ command using the NFC
readers embedded in it. If a HCE-enabled smartphone is brought close to the table top in the
unlock state, the smartphone will respond to the probe frame by sending back SEL_RES command
with the P2P bit set.
Interested readers can download the full code and the collected logs from https://github.
com/Tap-and-Ghost/Tap-n-Ghost*1.
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Fig. B.1 Diagram of an NFC reader/writer.
*1 We noticed that several models of Android always send back SEL_RES command with P2P bit set regardless of
whether the smartphone is locked or not, due to vendor customization.
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Fig. B.2 Layout of NFC reader/writers under a table top.
Fig. B.3 Overview of the smartphone status monitoring system inside a table.
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Fig. B.4 Overview of the smartphone status monitoring system inside a table with table cloth.
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C Supplemental Data
Fig. C.1 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (attack using Facebook app).
Fig. C.2 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (attack using Dropbox app).
C. SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
Fig. C.3 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (normal).
Fig. C.4 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (attacked).
Fig. C.5 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (dimmed using Screen Filter app).
Fig. C.6 Wi-Fi connection dialog box (customized for Xperia Z3).
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<?php
require ’vendor/autoload.php’;
$result = new WhichBrowser\Parser(getallheaders());
?>
<script>
var url = (
"http://attacker.website.com/device_info"
+ "?model=" + "<?php echo $result->device->model ?>"
+ "&language=" + navigator.language
+ "&orientation=" + screen.orientation.type
);
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open("GET", url, false);
xhr.send(null);
location.replace("about:blank");
</script>
Fig. C.7 An example of snippet code that implements the device fingerprinting. The
code makes uses of a third-party library called WhichBrowser [25]. After the device
fingerprinting completes, the browser will be redirected to a legitimate website such as
http://www.google.com or a blank page using the following JavaScript method: “lo-
cation.replace("about:blank");” which replaces the current URL to the new one and removes the
original URL from the session history; i.e., you cannot use the "back" button to return to the
original URL. Therefore, a victim will not notice that the device has accessed to a website used
for the device fingerprinting.
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C. SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
Table C.1 List of confirmation messages invoked by the WiFiConfig record.
Type Title Message Positive Button Negative Button
WI-EN-1 Connect to network Connect to network <SSID>? CONNECT CANCEL
WI-EN-2 Connect Connect to <SSID>? YES NO
WI-EN-3 <SSID> Connct to this network? CONNECT CANCEL
Table C.2 List of confirmation messages invoked by the BTSSP record
Type Title Message Positive
Button
Negative
Button
BT-EN-1 — Are you sure you want to pair the Bluetooth device ? YES NO
BT-EN-2 — Bluetooth pairing requested. Pair? YES NO
BT-EN-3 — Pair with [<name>]? YES NO
BT-EN-4 NFC pairing request Pair with the Bluetooth device ? Pair Cancel
BT-EN-5 — Pair the Bluetooth device ? YES NO
Table C.3 Results of Feasibility Studies.
Device Manufacture Android
Version
Maximum
Reading
Distance
[cm]
NFC R/W
Activated in
Factory
State
Message
Type
(Wi-Fi)
Message
Type
(Blue-
tooth)
ONETOUCH IDOL 2 S ALCATEL 4.3 3.0 — BT-EN-1
Nexus 7 ASUS 6.0.1 4.0 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
SAMURAI KIWAMI FREETEL 5.1 3.0 WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
ARROWS NX F-05F FUJITSU 5.0.2 4.0 WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
Nexus 9 HTC 7.0 4.5 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
INFOBAR A02 HTC 4.1.1 2.5 — BT-EN-1
Ascend P7 HUAWEI 4.4.2 3.5 ✓ — BT-EN-4
TORQUE G02 KYOCERA 5.1 3.5 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
TORQUE G01 KYOCERA 4.4.2 3.5 ✓ — BT-EN-1
Nexus 5X LG 6.0 4.5 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
isai vivid LG 5.1 5.0 ✓ WI-EN-2 BT-EN-2
DM-01G LG 5.0.2 5.0 WI-EN-2 BT-EN-2
ELUGA P PANASONIC 4.2.2 2.0 — BT-EN-1
Galaxy S7 edge SAMSUNG 6.0.1 3.0 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-5
Galaxy S6 edge SAMSUNG 6.0.1 2.0 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-5
Galaxy S4 SAMSUNG 5.0.1 3.0 WI-EN-1 BT-EN-5
AQUOS ZETA SH-01H SHARP 5.1.1 3.5 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
AQUOS ZETA SH-04F SHARP 5.0.2 3.5 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
AQUOS SERIE SHARP 5.0.2 3.0 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-1
Xperia XZ SONY 7.0 3.0 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-3
Xperia Z5 SONY 6.0 3.0 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-3
Xperia Z4 SONY 6.0 4.0 ✓ WI-EN-1 BT-EN-3
Xperia Z3 SONY 5.0.2 3.0 ✓ WI-EN-3 BT-EN-3
Xperia Z2 SONY 5.0.2 2.5 WI-EN-3 BT-EN-3
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